On April 15, 2019, the Supreme Court will hear arguments on whether dirty words and vulgar terms may be registrable as trademarks – and if so, what is the test? Section 2(a) of the Trademark Act currently provides that the Trademark Office may refuse registration of a mark that “[c]onsists of or comprises immoral… or scandalous matter.” Erik Brunetti, the owner of the FUCT brand of clothing, filed applications to register his mark. He almost got one registered – it was approved, but the approval by the Trademark Office was withdrawn after the Matal v. Tam decision. The issues now before the Court are whether (1) the statutory prohibition against registration of a “immoral” or “scandalous” marks is facially invalid; and (2) the statute as applied to the registration of “immoral” or “scandalous” marks is constitutionally vague under the First and Fifth Amendments.
The Supreme Court, in Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 198 L. Ed. 2d 366 (2017), held that the particular language in Section 2(a) refusing registration of a trademark on grounds that the mark may “disparage or … bring them into contempt or disrepute” was facially invalid under the First Amendment as viewpoint discrimination. Tam was a plurality opinion, which is subject to the narrowest of interpretations. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977). While all members of the Court held the disparagement clause of Section 2(a) to be facially invalid, the Court was divided over the level of scrutiny generally to be applied to free speech challenges to the Trademark Act. As Justice Kennedy stated in Tam, “We leave open the question whether this is the appropriate framework for analyzing free speech challenges to provisions of the Lanham Act.” 137 S. Ct. at 1768 (Kennedy, J.). No one addressed “immoral” or “scandalous” terms. Continue Reading
“We live in a natural world, and all inventions are constrained by the laws of nature . . . we must be careful not to overly abstract claims when performing the Alice analysis.”[1] These are the promising words from the Federal Circuit in its recent decision in Natural Alternatives v. Creative Compounds, in which the court held that dietary supplements, methods of treatment using the same and methods of manufacturing the same are directed to patent-eligible subject matter.
On Feb. 1, 2019, the Venezuelan Ministry of National Commerce sent a notification that patent and trademark fees shall be paid in the Venezuelan cryptocurrency “PETRO.” HOWEVER, the United States government, by Executive Order 13827 (March 19, 2018), expressly prohibits such transactions by U.S. persons, including individuals and companies, relating to any digital currency, digital coin or digital token issued by, for or on behalf of the government of Venezuela on or after Jan. 9, 2018. Accordingly, at this time we cannot pay for renewal or registration of your trademarks or patents in Venezuela. We do not know if or when this may be resolved. If you have something coming up for renewal in Venezuela, it may not be possible to pay the fees. Stay tuned.
Oral argument before the Supreme Court was held on February 20 in the much-watched and even more intensely discussed trademark dispute Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC.[i] The case presents the difficult and multifaceted question: Does bankruptcy law insulate the right of a trademark licensee to continue using the licensed mark despite the bankrupt trademark licensor’s decision to “reject” the remaining term of the trademark license?
In Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC,[1] the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that claims covering methods for diagnosing neurological disorders by detecting autoantibodies are directed to a natural law together with conventional steps, and are therefore invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Although the claims at issue were said to be directed to patent ineligible subject matter, the court offered further guidance for applicants in the diagnostic space. 
This week, the Supreme Court issued a decision holding that a secret sale qualifies as prior art. At issue was whether the America Invents Act (AIA) changed the “on sale” bar to patentability to exempt secret sales as prior art.[1] The case, Helsinn Healthcare v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, arose out of agreements entered into by Helsinn and MGI Pharma, to which Helsinn granted the right to sell a treatment used to reduce nausea caused by chemotherapy. The agreements included a provision requiring MGI Pharma to keep confidential any proprietary information received under the agreements. Approximately two years after execution of the agreement, Helsinn filed four provisional patent applications covering the treatment.
